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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In this consolidated case, Mr. Skunkcap has raised numerous challenges on 
appeal for his convictions. This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's 
responses to these claims. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Skunkcap's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err in NO.34746 when it failed to properly instruct the jury, in 
response to the jurors' question, that the mens rea of malice for the crime of 
malicious injury to property applies to the act of the destruction of the property? 
2. Did the district court err in NO.34746 where its instructions on felony eluding a 
police officer constituted a comment on the evidence and relieved the State of its 
constitutional burden of proof as to the material elements of this offense, and 
where the district court's instructions on simple assault relieved the state of its 
burden of proof as to all of the elements of the charged offense? 
3. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct, rising to the level of a fundamental error, 
in NO.34746 when a police officer provided irrelevant, non-responsive testimony 
designed to appeal to the passions and prejudice of the jury? 
4. Did the district court err in failing to conduct a sufficient inquiry into the alleged 
conflict of interest between Mr. Skunkcap and his appointed attorney in 
Nos.34747 and 38249? 
5. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Skunkcap's motion alleging an illegal 
sentence in NO.38249 because Mr. Skunkcap's original sentence for felony 
eluding a police officer, with a persistent violator sentencing enhancement, 
became void upon the district court granting his motion to withdraw his plea to 
this enhancement and the district court never resentenced Mr. Skunkcap for the 
underlying offense? 
6. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct, rising to the level of a fundamental error, 
in NO.34747 when the prosecutor intentionally elicited testimony from a police 
officer regarding Mr. Skunkcap's exercise of his Fifth Amendment right to remain 
silent? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred In NO.34746 When It Failed To Properly Instruct The Jury, In 
Response To The Jurors' Question, That The Mens Rea Of Malice For The Crime Of 
Malicious Injury To Property Applies To The Act Of The Destruction Of The Property 
A. Introduction 
In this case, Mr. Skunkcap has challenged as error the district court's failure to 
correctly instruct the jury in response to a specific question tendered by the jury to the 
court during its deliberations regarding the State's burden of proof. The State on appeal 
appears to have misapprehended Mr. Skunkcap's claim, choosing to respond solely to 
an issue not presented by Mr. Skunkcap on appeal - i.e. whether the initially presented 
jury instructions were accurate. The question of whether the district court correctly 
instructed the jury regarding a question tendered by the jurors during deliberations is a 
separate consideration, and one not addressed by the State in this appeal. Under a 
review of the case law governing the claim actually made by Mr. Skunkcap, coupled 
with pertinent case law regarding the jurors' question in this case, the district court's 
response to the jurors' question was reversible error. 
B. The District Court Erred In NO.34746 When It Failed To Properly Instruct The 
JUry, In Response To The Jurors' Question, That The Mens Rea Of Malice For 
The Crime Of Malicious Injury To Property Applies To The Act Of The 
Destruction Of The Property 
On appeal, Mr. Skunkcap has challenged the district court's failure to property 
instruct the jury as to the requisite mens rea for malicious injury to property specifically 
in response to the questions of the jurors regarding this intent. (See Appellant's Brief, 
pp.26-31.) The sum and substance of the State's response in this appeal to this claim 
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of error is limited to an assertion that the court's initial jury instruction as to the elements 
of this offense was not challenged on appeal and was a correct instruction of the 
elements of malicious injury to property. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-11.) This argument 
misinterprets the actual issue on appeal, which centers on the district court's failure to 
provide a correct legal instruction in the face of the question by the jurors as to what 
mens rea was required to convict Mr. Skunkcap. Under a review of the legal standards 
for this claim, there was clear error in the district court's failure to correctly instruct the 
jurors as to the State's burden of proof. 
As an initial matter, there is a distinction between a claim of error in the pattern 
to-conviction instructions provided to the jury by the court and a claim of error in the trial 
court's failure to adequately and correctly respond to a question posed by the jurors in 
the course of their deliberation. It is the latter, rather than the former, that is at issue in 
this appeal. The two claims share the same standard of review by this Court - this 
Court reviews de novo whether the trial court's instructions are legally correct. See, 
e.g., State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 281-282 (2003). However, this Court also 
applies a distinct mode of analysis to the discrete question of whether the trial court's 
response specific to a question posed by the jury during their deliberations was in error. 
As a general rule, it is a matter within the trial court's discretion to determine 
whether and how to respond to a specific question posed by the jurors during the 
course of their deliberations. See, e.g., State v. Pinkney, 115 Idaho 1152, 1154 
(Ct. App. 1989). "However, if a jury makes explicit its difficulties with a point of law 
pertinent to the case, thereby revealing a defect, ambiguity or gap in the instructions, 
then the trial court has the duty to give such additional instructions on the law as 
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are reasonably necessary to alleviate the jury's doubt or concern." Id. (emphasis 
added); see also Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 282 (adopting the standards articulated in 
Pinkney). Accordingly, the trial court may be under a legal duty to provide additional 
instructions to the jury, in addition to the standard jury instructions, where the jurors 
submit a question to the district court that reveals a potential defect, gap, or ambiguity in 
the initial instructions. Such was the case here with regard to the intent element for 
malicious injury to property. 
With this distinction in mind, Mr. Skunkcap asserts that the trial court in this case 
failed to provide an adequate and legally correct response to the jurors' question 
regarding the mens rea for malicious injury to property. The State has claimed in this 
appeal that the distinction between mere negligent conduct and the malice actually 
required for malicious injury to property is, "an issue not presented in this case." 
(Respondent's Brief, p.8.) Mr. Skunkcap respectfully disagrees, and asserts that this 
issue is central to his claim on appeal given the nature of the jurors' question in this 
case. 
The jury made explicit its difficulties in understanding a specific point of law with 
regard to the charge of malicious injury to property. That is, the jurors were confused as 
to whether the State had to prove that Mr. Skunkcap intended to injure the officers' 
property or whether "any unintentional damage" could be considered malicious. 
(34746 Tr., p.509, Ls.8-10; 34746 R., p.281.) The case law defining this offense 
provides a clear answer. to the ambiguity identified by the jurors regarding the intent 
element for malicious injury to property: "[t]he word 'maliciously' is used in the first 
clause of [I.C. § 18-7001 (1)] and describes the requisite state of mind with which the 
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injury or destruction of the property is carried out." State v. Nunes, 131 Idaho 408, 
409-410 (Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis added). Put another way, "I.C. § 18-7001 creates 
culpability for malicious injury to property only where the defendant's conduct causing 
the injury is accompanied by an intent to injure the property of another." State v. 
Nastoff, 124 Idaho 667, 670 (Ct. App. 1993). Rather than clarify the law for the jurors, 
the district court merely informed them that, "[a]s far as the law goes, all I can tell you is 
go back and look at the definition of 'malicious' again." (34746 Tr., p.525, L.24 - p.526, 
L.1.) This response amounted to a failure to "directly deal with [the jurors'] obvious 
confusion," and further permitted the jury, "to speculate on this point of law." See 
Pinkney, 115 Idaho at 1154. Accordingly, this was error. Id. 
In addition, the district court's failure to address the jurors' question potentially 
permitted the jury to find Mr. Skunkcap guilty of malicious injury to property for conduct 
that would not constitute the offense charged. Idaho Code § 18-7001 (1) does not 
permit a conviction for malicious injury to property for any and all action that happens to 
result in the injury or destruction of property - only where the action was undertaken 
with the concrete aim and intent of such injury. Nunes, 131 Idaho at 409-410; Nastoff, 
124 Idaho at 669-670. The jurors' question reflected a basic confusion as to whether 
inadvertent damage caused during the commission of any wrongful act constituted the 
charged offense. The law is clear - it does not. Because the court's response (or, 
more accurately, lack of a response) to the jurors' question left the impression that 
conduct not within the ambit of I.C. § 18-7001 (1) could be used to sustain a finding of 
guilt, this was error. State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 341-342 (2011). 
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In addition, the State takes issue with Mr. Skunkcap's characterization of the 
mens rea element for malicious injury to property as a "specific intent." (Respondent's 
Brief, p.10.) Mr. Skunkcap asserts that, under the case law interpreting the pertinent 
statute defining this offense - I.C. § 18-7001 - as well as the plain language of the 
statute itself, malicious injury to property is a specific intent crime. As a starting point, it 
is useful to note what constitutes a specific intent offense. The Idaho Court of Appeals 
in State v. Rolon provides a concise analysis on this point: 
Negating the specific intent element [of a criminal offense] amounts to 
fundamental error. A general intent element is satisfied if it is shown that 
the defendant knowingly performed the proscribed acts, but a specific 
intent requirement refers to the state of mind which in part defines 
the crime and is an element thereof. In other words, specific intent 
requires not only the doing of an act, but the performance of the act 
with the intent to cause the proscribed result. 
State v. Rolon, 146 Idaho 684, 691 (Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis added) (internal citations 
omitted). 
By statute, the offense of malicious injury to property occurs when an individual, 
"maliciously injures or destroys" the real or personal property of another without 
permission. See I.C. § 18-7001 (1). The destruction or injury of the property is an 
element of this offense, and this element is also subsumed within the mens rea element 
for this offense. Nunes, 131 Idaho at 409-410; Nastoff, 124 Idaho at 669-670. Put 
another way, the statute does not criminalize any and all malicious or wrongful action 
that happens to result in injury or destruction of property, but only criminalizes the 
performance of those acts undertaken with the intent to cause the proscribed result: 
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injury or damage to the property of another. Id. This falls squarely within the ambit of a 
specific intent crime. 1 See Rolon, 146 Idaho at 691. 
Although the State acknowledges that Idaho case law interpreting the statute 
defining malicious injury to property has been consistently interpreted to require "an 
intent to injure to the property of another," the State thereafter makes the assertion that 
the cases so acknowledged, "were merely interpreting I.C. § 18-101 (4)'s language 
defining malice, not re-writing it to require specific intent in lieu of malice." 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.9-10.) To the extent that the State is asserting that the cases 
do not form part of the law governing this offense, this argument is untenable. First, the 
cases cited were actually interpreting the intent required for the specific charge of 
malicious injury to property in light of the statutory language in I.C. § 18-7001 (1), and 
not merely the statute defining malice generally as contained in I.C. § 18-101 (4). 
Nunes, 131 Idaho at 409-410; Nastoff, 124 Idaho at 669-670.; I.C. § 18-7001(1). And, 
based upon these decisions, the malice intent required by I.C. § 18-7001 must be 
specifically tied to the actual act of destroying or injuring the property at issue. 
Second, to the extent that the State may be arguing that the case law interpreting 
the offense of malicious injury to property is not authoritative in defining what is required 
to prove the offense - and hence the proper law as to which the jury must be instructed 
- this argument reflects a basic misapprehension of the role and power of the courts. 
1 However, regardless of the semantic parsing of whether malicious injury to property is 
a specific intent or a general intent offense, what is abundantly clear from the law is that 
the mens rea element of this offense requires that the malice intent be specific to the 
actual injury of property itself. It is not sufficient that the defendant was merely 
performing any unlawful act in which an injury may be the inadvertent result. 
Accordingly, the State's dispute on this point appears to be one of form, rather than 
substance. 
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The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law for the resolution of the courts 
and is part of this Court's duty in construing statutes so as to determine the law. See, 
e.g., State v. Schumacher, 136 Idaho 509, 519 (Ct. App. 2001); In re Speer, 53 Idaho 
293, 241 (1933). Once the Courts have interpreted a statute, that interpretation is 
deemed authoritative and carries with it stare decisis effect. See, e.g., Rogers v. 
Household Life Ins. Co., 150 Idaho 735, 739 (2011). Moreover, where the courts have 
interpreted a statute to have a particular meaning, and the legislature makes no effort 
over the passage of time to amend the statute, the legislature is presumed to have 
adopted this interpretation through acquiescence. See, e.g., Speer, 53 Idaho at 241; 
State v. Mace, 133 Idaho 903, 907 (Ct. App. 2000). During the nearly 20 intervening 
years since the court in Nastoff interpreted I.C. § 18-7001 to require the specific intent 
to injure or destroy the property at issue, the legislature has not amended this statute in 
any way, and therefore has presumably acquiesced in the courts' interpretation of this 
statute. As such, the decisions interpreting I.C. § 18-7001 (1) as requiring a malicious 
intent specifically to injure or destroy property were part and parcel of the legal 
standards for this offense, and the jury should have been instructed as to these 
standards accordingly. 
Finally, this error was not harmless. The State has asserted on appeal that 
"there is no reasonable view of the evidence that Skunkcap did not act intentionally 
when he rammed two stopped police cars." (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-11.) The 
State's assertion is unavailing because it misapprehends the State's evidentiary burden 
at issue for the intent element of malicious injury to property, and misstates the correct 
standard of this Court's review and the nature of the evidence at trial. 
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The question for the jury as to the charge of malicious injury to property was not 
whether Mr. Skunkcap intentionally or maliciously collided with the officers while trying 
to avoid their vehicles, but whether he intended specifically to damage these vehicles. 
"The words of the statute do not imply a legislative intent to create criminal liability under 
this section where the injury to property was an unintended consequence of conduct 
that may have violated another statute." Nastoff, 124 Idaho at 669-670. Accordingly, 
the question for this Court is not whether there is overwhelming and uncontroverted 
evidence that Mr. Skunkcap intentionally or maliciously collided with Detective Collins' 
unmarked truck (which is the only potential basis of criminal liability found by the jury for 
this charge), but whether there is overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence that 
Mr. Skunkcap had the intent specifically to damage this truck. 
Second, because the district court's failure to correct the jurors' confusion as to 
the mens rea element in this case potentially permitted the jurors to find Mr. Skunkcap 
guilty of malicious injury to property for conduct not criminal under the statute, and 
relieved the State of its burden of proof as to the intent to injure or destroy property, this 
Court applies the standard of harmless error articulated in Neder v. U.S., 527 U.S. 1, 
15-20 (1999). See also State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 591-592 (2011) (applying the 
Neder harmless error test to claim of fundamental error in jury instruction that relieved 
the State of its burden of proof as to the elements of the charged offense). 
The test for harmlessness under Neder is whether it appears, "beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." 
Neder, 527 U.S. at 15 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 14 (1967)). Under 
this test, the proper inquiry for this Court is whether, "the record contains evidence that 
10 
could rationally lead to a finding for the defendant with respect to the omitted element." 
Rolon, 146 Idaho at 689. In addition, the element at issue must be uncontested and 
supported by overwhelming evidence. Neder, 527 U.S. at 17. If the defendant contests 
the omitted element, the requirement pronounced in Neder that the "omitted element 
was uncontested," is not met and the error cannot be said to be harmless. Draper, 151 
Idaho at 592. 
The record reflects that Mr. Skunkcap vigorously contested the issue of whether 
he intended to damage the vehicles that he collided with through his own testimony at 
trial. Mr. Skunkcap testified that, prior to the collision, he did not see any approaching 
vehicles. (34746 Tr., p.425, Ls.18-22.) He further testified that he did not back into the 
second officer's vehicle that was coming at him from behind, but that this officer was the 
one who collided into Mr. Skunkcap's car. (34746 Tr., p.435, Ls.10-24.) Most notably, 
when asked directly if he intended to injure or harm either of the two vehicles involved in 
the collisions, Mr. Skunkcap denied having this intent. (34746 Tr., p.435, L.25 - p.436, 
L.4.) Accordingly, the intent element for malicious injury to property was entirely 
controverted at trial. 
Moreover, the jury's verdict in this case reflects that they did not fully accept the 
State's version of the evidence with regard to Mr. Skunkcap's alleged conduct. The 
jurors in this case entered a hand-written finding that they were limiting their finding as 
to guilt for malicious injury to property to solely the "second collision to 2003 red Ford 
Escape." (R., p.226.) Where the jury enters such an acquittal, it is important evidence 
that the jury did not entirely accept the State's version of the facts for purposes of 
harmless error review. See, e.g., State v. Lilly, 142 Idaho 70,74 (Ct. App. 2005). 
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Finally, the nature of the jurors' question, in and of itself, constitutes a measure of 
prima facie proof that there was not overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence that 
Mr. Skunkcap intended to injure Detective Collins' truck. The jury was clearly 
concerned as to whether there was proof of the intent to cause injury, as their query 
focused on whether such a finding was required or whether, when committing a 
wrongful act, "any unintentional damage" could be considered malicious. (34746 
Tr., p.509, Ls.8-10; 34746 R., p.281.) Clearly the jury considered the issue of whether 
the damage was intended by Mr. Skunkcap to be in dispute, given the nature of their 
question to the trial court. See Gittins, 129 Idaho at 57 (holding that "It is obvious that 
the jury considered the element of penetration to be in dispute as illustrated by the 
request for further clarification."). 
Accordingly, the district court's error in failing to correctly instruct the jury in 
response to their question as to the mens rea element for malicious injury to property 
was not harmless. 
II. 
The District Court Erred In No.34746, Where Its Instructions On Felony Eluding A Police 
Officer Created An Unlawful Presumption In The State's Favor And Relieved The State 
Of Its Constitutional Burden Of Proof As To The Material Elements Of This Offense, 
And Where The District Court's Instructions On Simple Assault Relieved The State Of 
Its Burden Of Proof As To All Of The Elements Of The Charged Offense 
A. Introduction 
The district court provided the jury with non-pattern elements instructions in this 
case with regard to both the offense of felony eluding a police officer and assault. In 
both cases, the non-pattern instructions relieved the State of its burden of proof as to 
both offenses. Contrary to the State's assertion with regard to the instructions for felony 
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eluding a police officer, an instruction can have the effect of relieving the State of its 
burden of proof as to the charged offense even if the instruction parrots the language 
contained in the relevant statute if the manner in which the court presents the elements 
does not reflect the proper burden of proof for the offense. The court's instruction on 
felony eluding a police officer did so in this case. In addition, this Reply Brief is 
necessary to clarify that the doctrine of invited error is not properly applicable with 
regard to Mr. Skunkcap's claim of error regarding the jury instruction purporting to 
define the elements of assault in this case. 
B. The District Court's Non-Pattern Elements Instruction Regarding Felony Eluding 
A Police Officer Both Relieved The State Of Its Burden Of Proof As To All Of The 
Elements Of This Offense, And Unlawfully Created An Evidentiary Presumption 
In The State's Favor; And This Error Rose To The Level Of A Fundamental Error 
There are three primary arguments that the State raises in response to 
Mr. Skunkcap's allegation of error in the non-pattern elements instruction that the district 
court provided to the jury for the offense of felony eluding an officer. First, the State 
asserts that this instruction is "similar to the language used in the model instructions," 
and uses the language incorporated into the statute defining this offense, and therefore 
by the State's reasoning could not be erroneous. (Respondent's Brief, p.14.) Second, 
the State claims that Mr. Skunkcap, "has failed to cite any case in which an instruction 
using the statutory language applicable to a crime has risen to a violation of due 
process." (Respondent's Brief, p.14.) Third, the State posits that any error is harmless 
given a potentially conflicting portion of the same instruction. Mr. Skunkcap will address 
each of these claims in turn. 
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As to the State's initial claim, Mr. Skunkcap disputes that the instruction provided 
by the district court is similar to the model pattern instructions. In fact, the two differ in 
one critical and material respect. The model pattern instructions make clear that, as 
part of the State's burden of proof at trial, the State must establish that the, "signal to 
stop must be given by emergency lights or siren which a reasonable person knew or 
should have known was intended to bring the pursued vehicle to a stop." See I.C.J.1. 
1033 (emphasis added). Through setting out that the signal to stop "must be" of a 
particular nature - i.e. such that a reasonable person would have known that he or she 
was being signaled to stop - this instruction makes it clear to the jury that this finding is 
required along with all of the other remaining elements in order to find the defendant 
guilty. 
In contrast, after setting out the statutory elements for this offense, the district 
court departed from the approved-of language and informed the jury in an entirely 
separate provision that, "** It is sufficient proof that a reasonable person who knew or 
should have known that the visual or audible signal given by a peace officer was 
intended to bring pursued vehicle to a stop." (R., p.245) (emphasis in the original). By 
setting this provision apart from the elements instruction physically, and further 
separating out this provision by marking it with two asterisks and italicized font, the 
court's language carries with it the clear import that, in order to convict the defendant "it 
is sufficient proof" for the offense if the jury were merely to find that a reasonable person 
knew or should have known that he or she was being signaled to stop. The difference 
in language between the model pattern instructions and that provided by the Court is 
that the pattern instructions make clear that the nature of the signal is part of the State's 
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burden of proof at trial - i.e. the signal must be such that a reasonable person would 
have known that he or she was being signaled to stop - whereas the court's instructions 
implied that it was sufficient proof for the offense standing alone that a reasonable 
person would have known that he or she was being signaled to stop. 
The State is also incorrect when it asserts that the language used is an accurate 
reflection of the statute in light of the legislative history for this provision of the statute. 
Mr. Skunkcap discussed this history at length in his Appellant's Brief (see Appellant's 
Brief, pp.35-37), but the clearest evidence that the court's instruction in this case did not 
accurately reflect the substance of the statute can be found in the legislative history of 
the provision at issue. The disputed language was added to I.C. § 49-1404 in 1996. 
See S.L. 1996, ch. 255, § 1. In clarifying the meaning and import of this language, the 
legislature made clear that the disputed language contained in this statute, "would 
require the prosecutors to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a person knew or 
should have known that he or she was required to pull over and stop." S.L. 1996, ch. 
255, §1. Therefore, although the language provided by the district court is similar to that 
employed within the statute defining felony eluding an officer, the manner in which this 
language was presented to the jury had the effect of diminishing the State's burden of 
proof at trial. 
Which leads to the State's second contention: that Mr. Skunkcap, "has failed to 
cite any case in which an instruction using the statutory language applicable to a crime 
has risen to a violation of due process." (Respondent's Brief, p.14.) This is not a 
correct assertion. Notably, the Idaho Supreme Court in Draper held precisely that: the 
elements instruction provided to the jury for conspiracy in Draper did contain all of the 
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elements for the charged offense; and Mr. Skunkcap has cited to this case on appeal. 
See Draper, 151 Idaho at 589-592. (See also Appellant's Brief, pp.31-41.) In Draper, it 
was the manner in which the court presented the statutory elements of the offense that 
resulted in a jury instruction that relieved the State of its burden of proof at trial. 
In Draper, the district court presented the jury with an elements instruction that 
contained all of the elements of the charged offense, and therefore parroted the 
language of the relevant statute, but the court erroneously listed one of the essential 
elements as an alternate theory of demonstrating an overt act in furtherance of the 
conspiracy, rather than a free-standing element in its own right. Id. at 589-590. 
Because the trial court presented the separate element, that the action be undertaken in 
furtherance of the conspiracy, as being one of several alternative overt acts, rather than 
an element required in addition to the finding of an overt act, the Draper Court held 
that this instruction relieved the State of its burden of proof and violated due process. 
Id. at 590-592. This finding was predicated on the manner in which the statutory 
elements were presented to the jury, despite the fact that the statutory elements were 
technically present within the instruction. 
Additionally, to the extent that the State implies that the test for whether due 
process has been violated is whether an elements instruction merely contains the 
language within the statute, this misstates the standard. "The United States Supreme 
Court has held that in criminal trials 'the State must prove every element of the offense, 
and a jury instruction violates due process if it fails to give effect to this requirement." 
State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 749 (2007) (quoting Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 
433, 437 (2004)). Accordingly, whether a jury instruction violates due process by 
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reducing the State's burden of proof of the elements of an offense is measured by the 
effect of the language used, not whether the instruction merely contains the language 
of the statute. As has been noted, if a jury instruction contains the language of the 
statute defining the offense, but presents this language in a manner that fails to clearly 
require the jury to find all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, this 
violates a defendant's right to due process. Draper, 151 Idaho at 589-592. 
Moreover, to the extent that there existed another statement within this 
instruction that provided that the jury must find Mr. Skunkcap guilty "if each of the above 
has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt," this did not cure the error. This language 
followed both the list of the elements for eluding a police officer and the language that 
was separated out and improperly created an evidentiary presumption in the State's 
favor. (34746 R., p.245.) Because the language at issue, and the presumption in the 
State's favor that this language would appear to create, is likewise "above" the language 
relied upon by the State within the instruction, the same problem persists. 
At best, the passage relied upon by the State merely resulted in a conflict within 
the jury instructions as to what proof was sufficient in order to establish the offense of 
felony eluding an officer. And it is likewise error to provide the jury with conflicting 
instructions as to the required burden of proof and elements of the offense in a criminal 
case. See State v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 442, 445 (Ct. App. 2009); State v. Gittins, 129 
Idaho 54, 57-58 (Ct. App. 1996). In particular, the Gittins Court noted that where one 
portion of the jury instructions relieved the State of its burden of proof as to the charged 
offense and created an evidentiary presumption in the State's favor, "[t]he instructions 
as a whole became inherently contradictory and failed to accurately reflect the law." 
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Gittins, 129 Idaho at 57-58. Accordingly, the State's argument to the contrary is 
misplaced. 
C. The District Court's Non-Pattern Instruction For The Offense Of Assault In This 
Case Erroneously Misstated The Essential Elements Of The Offense Of Assault, 
And Thereby Reduced The State's Burden Of Proof Beyond A Reasonable 
Doubt As To All Elements Of The Charged Offense 
The State's sole contention on appeal with regard to the erroneous elements 
instruction provided to the jury for the charge of assault is a claim that the invited error 
doctrine precludes this Court's review of this issue. Mr. Skunkcap asserts that, given 
the limitations placed on the doctrine of invited error by Idaho courts, and in light of 
persuasive precedent from other jurisdictions with similar limitations, the invited error 
doctrine is inapplicable in this case. 
The State correctly notes that the elements instruction provided by the district 
court for assault is substantially the same as that tendered by defense counsel at trial. 
(34746 R., pp.210, 262; see also Respondent's Brief, pp.15-16.) In addition, appellate 
courts have applied the doctrine of invited error to allegations of instructional error under 
certain circumstances, such as the failure of a trial court to tender a lesser included 
offense instruction where defense counsel has objected to the court doing so. See, 
e.g., State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 402 (Ct. App. 2000). 
However, there are limits to the applications of the invited error doctrine. The 
outer boundaries of the invited error doctrine have been set forth by the Idaho Court of 
Appeals in State v. Griffith: 
There are, of course, limits to this doctrine. It would not apply to a 
requested sentence that violates the court's statutory authority. Neither 
would it apply to a request made without an apparent tactical purpose. 
Moreover, relief might be appropriate if defense counsel heedlessly 
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disregarded his client's legitimate interests, or otherwise provided 
ineffective assistance, in a sentencing proceeding. 
State v. Griffith, 110 Idaho 613, 614 (Ct. App. 1986) (internal citations omitted); see also 
State v. Carper, 116 Idaho 77, 79-80 (Ct. App. 1989) (reiterating the above-quoted 
standard from Griffith). 
Other courts applying similar limitations to the application of the invited error 
doctrine have held, in the context of a flawed jury instruction that omits an element of 
the charged offense, that the invited error doctrine does not apply even if defense 
counsel requested the instruction. See U.S. v. Alferahin, 433 F.3d 1148, 1154 n.2 (9th 
Cir. 2006); U.S. v. Perez, 116 F.3d 840, 843-846 (9th Cir. 1997); People V. Williams, 99 
Cal.Rptr. 103, 121-122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971). In those cases where the record does not 
reflect a conscious choice by counsel to forego a jury finding as to an essential element 
of a charged offense, but rather reflects inadvertence or mistake on the part of trial 
counsel, these courts have held that the purposes behind the invited error doctrine are 
not served and therefore declined to apply this doctrine. Id. 
The instructional error in this case falls outside of the boundaries established by 
Idaho case law for the application of the invited error doctrine. There is nothing in the 
record that shows, or could sustain a finding, of any strategic or tactical purpose in 
defense counsel submitting an instruction that substantially reduced the State's burden 
of proof at trial. In absence of such evidence, the instructional error in this case 
appears to fall within the exception carved out by the courts in Griffith and Carper for a 
"request made without an apparent tactical purpose." Carper, 116 Idaho at 79-80; 
Griffith, 110 Idaho at 614. Additionally, the erroneous instruction is affirmatively shown 
not to be part of a tactical strategy on the part of trial counsel, as Mr. Skunkcap 
19 
vigorously disputed that he ever harbored any intention to strike or harm the officers or 
their vehicles with his car at trial. (34647 Tr., p.446, L.10 - p.449, L.20.) 
Moreover, there appears to be at least one case in Idaho wherein the Idaho 
Supreme Court has declined to apply the doctrine of invited error to an erroneous jury 
instruction that relieved the State of its burden of proof of the elements of an offense. 
See State v. Nunez, 133 Idaho 13, 20 n. 3 (1999). In Nunez, the defendant was 
convicted of felony tax violations. Id. at 16. On appeal, he challenged his conviction for 
felony tax evasion because the jury instructions omitted the element that the defendant 
must intentionally seek to evade, defeat or avoid paying a sales tax - and it was this 
element that elevated the defendant's charge from a misdemeanor to a felony. Id. at 
19-20. Although the State attempted to invoke invited error to bar judicial review of this 
alleged error, the Nunez Court declined to apply this doctrine, and instead held that, 
"There is no invited error, as the State asserts, when defense counsel submitted 
improper instructions that were ultimately given." Id. at 20 n.3. 
Additionally, the Court of Appeals in Gittins likewise declined to apply the 
doctrine of invited error to a jury instruction that relieved the State of its burden of proof. 
Gittins, 129 Idaho at 58. Although the Gittins Court did so on the basis of a finding of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in trial counsel's consent to the erroneous instruction, 
Mr. Skunkcap asserts that a different, but related, rationale should be applied by this 
Court against the State's request on appeal to apply the invited error doctrine.2 
2 Mr. Skunkcap does not assert any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel herein, 
but chooses to reserve any such claim for any future petition for post-conviction relief, 
should one be forthcoming. See Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 806 (1992) 
(defendant may raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel either on direct appeal 
or through a petition for post-conviction relief, but not both). 
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The Griffith and Carper Courts recognized that, in addition to ineffective 
assistance of counsel, a "a request made without an apparent tactical purpose" can also 
stand as an independent exception to the application of the invited error doctrine. Here, 
there was no apparent tactical purpose to the request for an elements instruction for 
assault that essentially permitted a finding of guilt on a strict liability basis. Based upon 
the erroneous instruction, the jury could find Mr. Skunkcap guilty of this offense if he did 
any act, so long as it resulted in some well-founded fear of harm in another, rather than 
what is required by statute: that Mr. Skunkcap intentionally and unlawfully threaten the 
officer in addition to the officer experiencing a well-founded fear of harm. See 
I.C. § 18-901. There is no conceivable tactical purpose for defense counsel to reduce 
the State's burden of proof at trial in this regard. Rather, this request appears to reflect 
a mistaken understanding on the part of trial counsel as to the elements of assault. 
Accordingly, Mr. Skunkcap respectfully submits that this Court should decline the 
State's request to apply the doctrine of invited error in this case. 
III. 
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental Error, 
In NO.34746 When A Police Officer Provided Irrelevant, Non-Responsive Testimony 
Designed To Appeal To The Passions And Prejudice Of The Jury 
A. Introduction 
Appeals to the passions and prejudices of the jury, or attempts on the part of the 
prosecution to secure a conviction on any factor other than the law and the evidence, 
impact upon a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial. Such a 
constitutionally improper appeal took place in this case with regard to Officer Dahlquist's 
irrelevant and non-responsive testimony that Mr. Skunkcap did not have regard for the 
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safety of anyone on the street on the day in question. The record in this case is clear 
that this due process violation occurred and that it was not harmless. 
B. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental 
Error, In NO.34746 When A Police Officer Provided Irrelevant, Non-Responsive 
Testimony Designed To Appeal To The Passions And Prejudice Of The Jury 
In response to Mr. Skunkcap's claim of prosecutorial misconduct, rising to the 
level of a fundamental error, in Officer's Dahlquist's improper testimony, the State first 
asserts that this testimony falls within the category of evidentiary error as opposed to 
constitutional error. (Respondent's Brief, pp.17 -18.) While the challenged testimony 
provided at trial was both irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, the State's argument 
overlooks the core issue as to why this evidence was unduly prejudicial: because 
Officer's Dahlquist's unsolicited statements were an appeal to the passions and 
prejudice of the jurors which constitutes a violation of Mr. Skunkcap's due process right 
to fairness at trial. See, e.g., State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 62 (2011); State v. Porter, 
130 Idaho 772, 730 (1997); State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318 (Ct. App. 2005). 
Such testimony can rise to the level of a due process violation because an appeal to the 
jurors' emotions is an improper attempt to induce the jury to convict the defendant 
based upon factors aside from the law or the evidence at trial. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 
209, 227 (2010). Because the challenged testimony was an appeal to the passions and 
prejudice of the jury, this impacted Mr. Skunkcap's due process right to fairness in his 
trial proceedings and was therefore of a constitutional magnitude. 
Regarding whether the error was plain on the record, the State appears to 
conflate the question of whether the error was harmless with the question of whether 
the error was plain. (Respondent's Brief, pp.18-19.) The salient question from this 
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Court is whether, on the face of the record, the error plainly exists; and this error is plain 
on the face of the record in this case. The officer's response was irrelevant, uncalled 
for, and plainly sought to invoke both the jurors' fear and their personal rebuke of 
Mr. Skunkcap based upon the officer's derogatory remarks. Such testimony on the part 
of a police officer is misconduct under clear legal standards. See Ellington, 151 Idaho 
at 60-61. 
Finally, Mr. Skunkcap submits that this error was not harmless for the reasons 
articulated within his Appellant's Brief. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.47-48.) 
IV. 
The Cumulative Errors In NO.34746 Require Reversal Of Mr. Skunkcap's Convictions In 
That Case 
The State correctly notes in its Respondent's Brief that this Court does not 
aggregate the prejudice for un-objected to errors; and that all but one of Mr. Skunkcap's 
claims of error with regard to his trial in 34746 were allegations of fundamental error. 
See Perry, 150 Idaho at 230. (See also Respondent's Brief, at 20.) Accordingly, 
Mr. Skunkcap withdraws his claim of cumulative error with regard to the errors alleged 
in 34746. 
V. 
The District Court Erred In Failing To Conduct A Sufficient Inquiry Into The Alleged 
Conflict Of Interest Between Mr. Skunkcap And His Appointed Attorney In Nos.34747 
And 38249 
A. Introduction 
In both 34747 and 38249, Mr. Skunkcap conveyed to the district court that there 
existed a potential conflict of interest between himself and his counsel, but the district 
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court failed to make an adequate inquiry into this conflict. The State's sole response on 
appeal is to deny that Mr. Skunkcap ever conveyed to the district court that a particular 
conflict may have existed. Because this assertion is belied by the record, Mr. Skunkcap 
asserts that the State's claim is without merit. 
B. The District Court Erred In Failing To Conduct A Sufficient Inquiry Into The 
Alleged Conflict Of Interest Between Mr. Skunkcap And His Appointed Attorney 
In Nos.34747 And 38249 
As a preliminary point of clarification, the State in its Respondent's Brief appears 
to partially misapprehend Mr. Skunkcap's allegation of error with regard to the failure to 
conduct a sufficient inquiry into his assertion of a conflict with his counsel in 34747 and 
38249. The State appears to reference a prior hearing involving predecessor counsel, 
Randall Schulthies, and Mr. Skunkcap that occurred in 34747, and that involved a 
different potential conflict than that at issue in this appeal, in claiming that Mr. Skunkcap 
actually opposed a motion for substitute counsel. (See 34747 R., pp.184-185; 34747 
Tr., p.204, L.5 - p.212, L.16; Respondent's Brief, p.25.) The allegations of error in 
within this appeal do not deal with this aspect of Mr. Skunkcap's trial - his claims are 
instead rooted in a subsequent conflict that Mr. Skunkcap alleged toward the attorneys 
appointed in Mr. Schulthies' stead, subsequent to Mr. Schulthies' withdrawal. (See 
Appellant's Brief, pp.49-55.) 
The State's remaining argument that Mr. Skunkcap did not convey to the district 
court that there existed a potential conflict between himself and the counsel he was 
appointed after Mr. Schulthies withdrew is not borne out by the record in this case. 
Regarding the alleged conflict in 34747, Mr. Skunkcap initially informed the district court 
that he had been having difficulties with his counsel. (34747 Tr., p.471 , L.14 - p.472, 
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L.9.) Although the district court did not ask for elaboration on his complaints, 
Mr. Skunkcap attempted to renew his objection to his appointed counsel at a 
subsequent point in the proceedings. When later asked if he had questions or 
comments for the court, Mr. Skunkcap asserted that he felt like his rights were being 
violated and that his trial counsel was unwilling to pursue these issues because they 
involved issues with former counsel, Mr. Schulthies, who worked in the same office as 
his present counsel. (34747 Tr., pA76, L.11 - pA78, L.9.) This was a concrete 
assertion of a potential conflict of interest in the form of divided loyalties - Mr. Skunkcap 
asserted that his trial counsel was not diligently representing Mr. Skunkcap's interests 
due to a hesitation to say or do anything that may be critical of his present counsel's co-
worker and boss. Accordingly, the State's assertion that Mr. Skunkcap did not allege a 
conflict in 34747 is incorrect. 
Similarly, both Mr. Skunkcap and his counsel in 38249 approached the district 
court with concerns of a potential conflict in the form of a breakdown of the attorney 
client relationship. In fact, counsel filed a motion to withdraw on the basis of a conflict of 
interest. (38249 Tr., pp.26-27.) Although Mr. Skunkcap was not present at the hearing 
on his counsel's motion, and therefore was not permitted to voice his objections at that 
time, Mr. Skunkcap informed the district court that he believed a conflict with his trial 
counsel existed at a subsequent hearing. (38249 Tr., p.12, L5 - p.16, LA.) These 
facts put the district court on notice that there was a potential conflict between 
Mr. Skunkcap and his appointed counsel. 
"Whenever a trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict 
may exist, the trial court has a duty of inquiry." State v. Lopez, 139 Idaho 256, 259 
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(Ct. App. 2003) (quoting State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 60 (2003)). The State does 
not dispute that this inquiry did not occur in either 34747 or 38249. Accordingly, 
Mr. Skunkcap submits that he has demonstrated reversible error in the district court's 
failure to conduct a sufficient inquiry as to his potential conflict with appointed counsel. 
VI. 
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Skunkcap's Motion Alleging An Illegal Sentence 
In NO.38249 Because Mr. Skunkcap's Original Sentence For Felony Eluding A Police 
Officer, With A Persistent Violator Sentencing Enhancement, Became Void Upon The 
District Court Granting His Motion To Withdraw His Plea To This Enhancement And The 
District Court Never Resentenced Mr. Skunkcap For The Underlying Offense 
A. Introduction 
The State in this appeal has asserted that the district court "reinstated the original 
eluding sentence," when the district court partly granted Mr. Skunkcap's motion alleging 
an illegal sentence in 38249. However, a review of the record in this case, including the 
district court's order on Mr. Skunkcap's Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) 
motion reveals this not to be the case. Because the district court, following 
Mr. Skunkcap's withdrawal of his plea to the persistent violator sentencing 
enhancement, never resentenced Mr. Skunkcap for his underlying offense of felony 
eluding an officer, a remand for resentencing is necessary in this case. 
B. The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Skunkcap's Motion Alleging An Illegal 
Sentence In No.38249 Because Mr. Skunkcap's Original Sentence For Felony 
Eluding A Police Officer, With A Persistent Violator Sentencing Enhancement, 
Became Void Upon The District Court Granting His Motion To Withdraw His Plea 
To This Enhancement And The District Court Never Resentenced Mr. Skunkcap 
For The Underlying Offense 
To the extent the State suggests that the district court in this case actually 
entered - or re-entered - a sentence for Mr. Skunkcap's felony eluding conviction, the 
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State's assertion is not supported by the record in this case. After Mr. Skunkcap was 
permitted to withdraw his plea to the persistent violator sentencing enhancement 
alleged by the State, and subsequent found to be a persistent violator following a jury 
trial, the district court at sentencing failed to resentence Mr. Skunkcap for his underlying 
conviction of felony eluding an officer in addition to the sentencing enhancement.3 
"The only legally cognizable sentence in a criminal case is the actual oral 
pronouncement in the presence of the defendant." State v. Dreier, 139 Idaho 246, 254 
(Ct. App. 2003). At the re-sentencing hearing in this case, the district court did not 
pronounce a new sentence for Mr. Skunkcap - and, in fact, stated that it had no 
authority to do so. The court stated, "The five years Judge McDermott gave you for the 
eluding charge, like I said, I can't do anything about that." (38249 Tr., p.314, Ls.21-
23.) The fact that the district court was under the mistaken belief that it was not 
required to re-sentence Mr. Skunkcap for the underlying felony eluding charge is further 
borne out by the fact that his written judgment of conviction upon resentencing has no 
provision whatsoever for his sentence for this offense. (38249 R., pp.114-116.) The 
only sentence set forth at all was for the "crime" of persistent violator. (38249 
R., pp.114-116.) 
Had the district court intended upon reinstating the prior sentence, as opposed to 
erroneously being of the belief that it lacked the authority to resentence Mr. Skunkcap 
for his felony eluding conviction, than the district court's language at the sentencing 
hearing would have reflected the court's understanding that it had the power to address 
3 In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Skunkcap erroneously references the underlying 
conviction as one for grand theft in one portion of his argument. (Appellant's Brief, 
p.57.) This should have listed as his conviction for felony eluding an officer. 
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this sentence. And, beyond this, the actual judgment of conviction entered by the 
district court would have surely contained a provision wherein Mr. Skunkcap would 
actually have received a sentence for his underlying offense. Neither is the case here. 
Nor does the court's order on Mr. Skunkcap's motion alleging an illegal sentence 
alter this fact. While the trial court stated it had the power to revisit Mr. Skunkcap's 
original sentence, and whether to order that sentence consecutive or concurrent, 
pursuant to its Rule 35 authority to grant leniency, the district court clearly was still of 
the mind that the sentence imposed on Mr. Skunkcap for felony eluding an officer was 
still extant and operative after he was allowed to withdraw his plea to the persistent 
violator enhancement. This is apparent in the fact that the district court stated that, "the 
sentences imposed by both Judge McDermott and this court were appropriate." 
(R., p.135 (emphasis added).) In addition, the district court referenced the fact that it 
had previously sentenced Mr. Skunkcap solely for "the enhancement charge of 
Persistent Violator," with no mention of the court even imposing any sentence for his 
underlying offense of felony eluding an officer. (R., p.134.) Had the district court been 
aware that Judge McDermott's prior sentencing order was no longer operative upon 
Mr. Skunkcap withdrawing his plea, the district court would not have referenced 
Mr. Skunkcap's "sentences" issued by both judges and would further have noted that 
Mr. Skunkcap's sentence for felony eluding had been re-imposed. 
The district court ignored in its entirety Mr. Skunkcap's allegation of an illegal 
sentence wherein he pointed out to the district court that the prior sentence was actually 
void and re-sentencing on Mr. Skunkcap's underlying criminal offense was required, 
not merely permitted. (R., pp.120-121.) In addition, even after reviewing the propriety 
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of Mr. Skunkcap's sentence for felony eluding in light of the portion of Mr. Skunkcap's 
Rule 35 motion requesting leniency, the district court still failed to enter any corrected 
judgment of conviction that actually reflected a sentence for felony eluding. (R., pp.134-
135.) The district court's order on this motion states, in pertinent part, that, "the length 
of the sentences on both the Eluding charge and the enhancement charge for being a 
Persistent Violator will remain unchanged." (R., p.135 (emphasis added).) But, as has 
been noted, Mr. Skunkcap had never actually been sentenced by the district court for 
his eluding offense following the withdrawal of his plea. Accordingly, the district court's 
recognition that it could reduce Mr. Skunkcap's sentence as part of a request for 
leniency did not alter the fact that Mr. Skunkcap had never actually been sentenced for 
his underlying offense. 
However, the State does correctly note that the trial court, in ruling on 
Mr. Skunkcap's Rule 35 motion, did recognize its authority to determine whether this 
sentence would run consecutively or concurrently to his other sentence for grand theft. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.31-32.) To the extent that Mr. Skunkcap had also asserted 
error in the district court's failure to recognize its authority to determine whether his 
sentence should run consecutively or concurrently, Mr. Skunkcap withdraws that portion 
of his argument on appeal. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.59-60.) 
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VII. 
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental Error, 
In NO.34747 When The Prosecutor Intentionally Elicited Testimony From A Police 
Officer Regarding Mr. Skunkcap's Exercise Of His Fifth Amendment Right To Remain 
Silent 
A. Introduction 
The State's sole argument on appeal regarding the repeated questions and 
answers in 34747 regarding his invocation of his right to remain silent is that this error 
was harmless. Because of the volume of this testimony, the inadequacy of the trial 
court's response to these improper questions, and the lack of overwhelming evidence of 
Mr. Skunkcap's guilt at trial, he asserts that the State's claim is without merit. 
B. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental 
Error, In NO.34747 When The Prosecutor Intentionally Elicited Testimony From A 
Police Officer Regarding Mr. Skunkcap's Exercise Of His Fifth Amendment Right 
To Remain Silent 
The State has conceded on appeal that it was a constitutional error, plain on the 
face of the record, for the State to repeatedly question Detective Nelson regarding 
Mr. Skunkcap's invocation of his right to remain silent, as well as for the officer to 
repeatedly reference his "attempts" at questioning Mr. Skunkcap in his testimony at trial. 
The sole dispute on this issue for this Court's resolution is whether these multiple 
instances of improper testimony were harmless. Mr. Skunkcap submits that they were 
not. 
From the outset, the State takes issue with Mr. Skunkcap's accounting of the 
frequency with which the improper testimony was placed in front of the jury. The State 
has characterized Mr. Skunkcap's argument as to the frequency with which the 
constitutionally impermissible testimony was presented as "hyperbolic." (Respondent's 
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Brief, p.30.) Mr. Skunkcap respectfully asserts that, when both the prosecutor's 
improper questions and Detective Nelson's improper responses are taken into individual 
account, there has been no overstatement as to the degree to which the improper 
testimony was injected into the trial proceedings. 4 
By appellate counsel's count, the prosecutor in this case asked a total of eight 
questions that either expressly called upon Detective Nelson to testify as to 
Mr. Skunkcap's invocation of his right to remain silent, or otherwise incorporated 
language about the officer "attempting" to interview Mr. Skunkcap within the State's 
question. (34747 Tr., p.405, Ls.18-19, 21, 23-24; 406, Ls.11-13; p.407, Ls.6-7; p.408, 
Ls.5-6, 9-10, 12-13.) For his part, the detective either directly testified to the fact that 
Mr. Skunkcap invoked his right to remain silent when questioned by police, or 
referenced "trying" or "attempting" to interview Mr. Skunkcap, in eight of his responses 
to the State's examination on this issue. (34747 Tr., p.405, Ls.11-12, 20, 22; p.406, 
Ls.6-10; p.407, Ls.17-19; p.408, Ls.7-8, 11, 14.) All of the statements and questions 
that incorporated language referencing "attempts" at interviewing Mr. Skunkcap had the 
same effect of commenting on his invocation of his right to remain silent as the 
questions and responses that directly informed the jury of this fact. See Ellington, 151 
Idaho at 59-61. 
However, regardless of what arithmetic is used to measure the specific number 
of offending statements and questions in this case, their volume is beyond dispute. The 
4 Detective Nelson's statements are considered by this Court to the same degree as the 
prosecutor's own questions because, "when an officer of the State gives any unsolicited 
testimony that is gratuitous and prejudicial to the defendant, that testimony will be 
imputed to the State for the purposes of determining prosecutorial misconduct." 
Ellington, 151 Idaho at 61. 
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prosecutor in this case made it a continual theme in his questioning of Detective Nelson 
to emphasize and re-emphasize the fact that Mr. Skunkcap was unwilling to answer 
police questions, to no discernible end other than to infer Mr. Skunkcap's guilt. 
In addition, the State argues to this Court that the trial court's instruction to the 
jury that the court did not "want [the jury] to hold it against Mr. Skunkcap that he 
wouldn't give a statement," was sufficient to cure these repeated errors. (34747 
Tr., pA09, Ls.6-10; Respondent's Brief, pp.30-31.) However, the State's argument in 
this regard fails to address Mr. Skunkcap's argument as to why this admonishment was 
inadequate. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.65-67.) As has been previously noted, this 
admonishment was deficient in two respects: first, the trial court improperly permitted 
the State to persist in its improper line of questioning and the detective's improper 
responses until a protracted chain of this testimony had been introduced; and second, 
the district court's statement was legally inadequate, as the court merely expressed its 
preference that the jury not consider this evidence rather than informing the jurors that 
they must not do so. (Appellant's Brief, pp.65-67.) 
Finally, Mr. Skunkcap asserts that his error was not harmless for the reasons 
stated within his Appellant's Brief. (Appellant's Brief, pp.64-65.) 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Skunkcap respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions of 
felony eluding an officer, assault, and malicious injury to property in 34746; his 
persistent violator sentencing enhancement in 38249, along with his sentence in 34746 
and 38249; and his conviction of grand theft in 34747. 
DATED this 3rd day of December, 2012. 
iSARAH E. TOMPKINS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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